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ABSTRACT
One of the most pressing problems in network research is the lack
of long-term trace data from ISPs. The Internet carries an enor-
mous volume and variety of data; mining this data can provide
valuable insight into the design and development of new protocols
and applications. Although capture cards for high-speed links ex-
ist today, actually making the network trafﬁc available for analysis
involves more than just getting the packets off the wire, but also
handling large and variable trafﬁc loads, sanitizing and anonymiz-
ing the data, and coordinating access by multiple users. In this
paper we discuss the requirements, challenges, and design of an ef-
fective trafﬁc monitoring infrastructure for network research. We
describe our experience in deploying and maintaining a multi-user
system for continuous trace collection at a large regional ISP. We
evaluate theperformanceofoursystemand showthatitcansupport
sustained collection and processing rates of over 160–300Mbits/s.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Opera-
tions—Network monitoring
General Terms
Measurement, Design
Keywords
Continuous trace collection, trace infrastructure
∗This material is based on work partially supported by the
United States Department of Homeland Security contract number
NBCHC040137 (”LANDER”). All conclusions of this work are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of
DHS.
Aleﬁya Hussain’s work was done primarily while she was at
USC/Information Sciences Institute.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciﬁc
permission and/or a fee.
SIGCOMM’05 Workshops, August 22–26, 2005, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Copyright 2005 ACM 1-59593-026-4/05/0008 ...$5.00.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet continues to grow rapidly in size and complexity,
it has become increasingly clear that its evolution is closely tied
to detailed understanding of its trafﬁc. The enormous volume and
mixture of data carried over the Internet provides a rich complexity.
This richness has made it difﬁcult to characterize, understand, and
model Internet trafﬁc from small-scale laboratory or testbed exper-
iments, and has made it challenging to design simulation models.
Trafﬁc monitoring and measurements can provide an invaluable
insight into the dynamics of network trafﬁc, trafﬁc engineering
and capacity planning, congestion and fault diagnosis, and security
analysis. However, monitoring trafﬁc on the Internet is a challeng-
ing task for a wide range of reasons. Many network events that
are of interest to the researcher are unpredictable and ephemeral:
if tracing is not enabled at the time when they occur, the opportu-
nity of capturing the event is lost. Even when captured, following
causality of such an event may be impossible unless enough his-
tory, that is network dynamics prior to the event, is captured as
well. Privacy and conﬁdentiality concerns limit the willingness of
manystakeholderstoparticipateindatacollectionandconstrainthe
release of data to a wider research community. At times, the data
is subjected to extensive anonymization rendering it unusable to a
wide variety of network studies. Further, since the Internet is orga-
nized as a set of interconnected networks, measurements taken at
any local network may not be representative of the whole Internet.
The resulting paucity of representative data has severely limited
network research. Currently network dynamics studies that eval-
uate the effects of new application and protocol deployment, or
long-term studies that observe the effect of incremental changes
on the Internet, and the change in the overall stability of the Inter-
net under various security threats are not possible. For example,
in the past few years, the research community has explored many
defense tools and methodologies to make the infrastructure more
robust [9]. But lacking real-world data, testing the efﬁcacy of the
tools and evaluating their readiness for widespread deployment has
been a continuing challenge.
To analyze a large range of network behaviors, one would need
to collect network trafﬁc on an ongoing basis rather than as a one-
time event to capture transient behaviors that provide insight into
network problems. Long term storage and mining of such measure-
ment data will provide a valuable step forward toward improving
the understanding of actual network dynamics.
In this paper, we describe a passive and continuous monitoring
infrastructure to collect, archive, and analyze network trafﬁc. Pas-
siveindicatesthenon-intrusivenatureoftheoperationalmonitoringsystem that does not interfere with the network trafﬁc. Continu-
ous refers to the ability of the collection system to capture network
traces uninterrupted for analysis and storage. Further, network traf-
ﬁc is stored and analyzed at different levels of anonymization to ac-
commodate user research requirements and privacy restrictions of
network data. Our system can provide network traces for a large
range of research projects that utilize long term data for the anal-
ysis and modeling of Internet trafﬁc. In Section 3 we explore the
requirements and challenges of building such a monitoring system
and in Section 4 we discuss our design choices in order to address
these requirements.
The contribution of this paper is the design, development, and
deployment of a monitoring and analysis infrastructure for data
mining that supports long term network trafﬁc storage. We describe
our experience in deploying and maintaining a system for continu-
ous trace collection at Los Nettos, a large regional ISP. We evaluate
theperformanceofoursysteminSection6andshowthatitcansup-
port sustained collection and processing rates of over 160Mbits/s
with peak rates of 300Mbits/s. while accommodating the require-
ments of different users. Additionally, we demonstrate how our
analysis system supports multiple users and permits the extraction
of various types of analysis data from the network trafﬁc.
2. RELATED WORK
Popular passive measurement systems include Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)-based network trafﬁc measurement
tools, tcpdump and NetFlow. SNMP is the most widely used net-
work management protocol in today’s Internet [1]. Agents and
remote monitors update a management information base (MIB)
within network routers, and management stations retrieve MIB in-
formationfromtheroutersusingUDP.While, SNMPprovidessome
aggregate statistics, it does not permit detailed network dynamics
studies which is the aim of the system proposed in this paper. An-
other common network monitoring tool is tcpdump [7], a network
sniffer with built-in ﬁltering capabilities. However, in high–volume
trafﬁc monitoring environments such as in ours, tcpdump performs
poorly due to inaccurate timestamps and packet drops during large
bursts. NetFlow is a monitoring system available on Cisco routers.
NetFlowcollectsﬂowstatisticsonanetworkinterface[11]andpro-
vides additional details about ﬂows than SNMP. NetFlow requires
an external recorder of captured data, it incurs a signiﬁcant perfor-
mancehitonrouters(andthusistypicallyusedonhigh-endrouters)
and in order to keep up with line rate it must switch to sampling.
Few other efforts have been made in capturing network behav-
ior and standardization of metrics. The AT&T trace collection
project relies on packet-level information collected by packet snif-
ferscalledPacketScopes, ﬂowstatisticscollectedusingCisco’sNet-
Flow tools, and routing information for network-wide trafﬁc anal-
ysis [2]. Similarly, the IPMON network designed by Sprint uses a
large number of of trace collection points emulate a fault and cap-
ture the effect of the network [5]. In both these projects, the net-
work trafﬁc data is for the exclusive use of the parent company and
the data is not available to the community at large for research. The
monitoring system described in this paper is unique in that it facil-
itates continuous, passive trace collection and the data is available
to the research community through the PREDICT project.
3. CHALLENGES
The design of an infrastructure to monitor, analyze and make
Internet data publicly available to research organizations presents
both policy and engineering challenges. In this section we outline
these challenges and requirements for such a system and, in the
next section we discuss how effective design choices in the archi-
tecture of the system can resolve most of these challenges.
3.1 Policy Challenges
There are a number of policy challenges which stem from the
requirements of developing a multiple users system with support
for long-term network studies that may require neighbor identiﬁca-
tion information. In this section, we discuss each of these require-
ments and the challenges associated in incorporating them into a
monitoring system. Finally, we discuss the strategy of associating
meta-data with network measurements.
MultipleUsers: Inordertosupportmanydifferentresearchprojects,
the system must seamlessly support multiple users, which presents
several challenges. First, since users typically have different data
requirements, each user will require custom processing of the data
to extract information relevant to their research. For example, a
user interested in studying long-term ﬂow behavior of the network
willneedmorecomplexprocessingtocorrelatenetworktraceswhile
a user interested in DNS trafﬁc can use simple packet ﬁlters to ex-
tract DNS packets. Additionally, some types of network studies
are more sensitive to packet sanitization and anonymization than
others. For example, techniques that retain only TCP/IP headers,
renumber IP addresses and scrub packet payloads are especially
crippling for network intrusion detection research and worm epi-
demiology studies, which require network preﬁx information to
analyze infection patterns. Thus, the monitoring system needs to
support a range of custom anonymization levels such that impor-
tant trafﬁc characteristics are not abstracted away.
Givendifferentprivacyrestrictionsandprojectrequirements, each
user will have different access privileges which map to data with
different anonymization levels. Some research projects such as
projects involving network security may still require access to raw,
un-anonymizedtrafﬁc, whileotherprojectscantolerateanonymiza-
tion of most network trafﬁc. Pang and Paxon describe techniques to
anonymize and transform network trafﬁc in order preserve privacy
while retaining important trafﬁc characteristics [10].
Finally, the system should have all the necessary access con-
trol and job isolation mechanisms to ensure data security. Since
network data will be available at various levels of anonymization,
thesemechanismswillpreventunauthorizedaccesstonetworkdata.
Long-term Studies: Some users will want to study long-term
characteristicsofthenetwork—inconsistentanonymizationwillpre-
vent such a study. The monitoring system needs to provide selec-
tive support for consistent IP address scrambling over extended pe-
riods of time. This is especially useful for projects such as trafﬁc
engineering, long-term network forecasting, and trafﬁc evolution
analysis. The utility of renumbering consistency must be balanced
against the privacy concerns in inverting mappings.
NeighborIdentiﬁcation: NeighborIdentiﬁcationinformationpro-
vides the last hop information of the network trafﬁc at the monitor-
ing location. For example, at the Internet backbone it would pro-
vide last hop peering information indicating which peer originated
the trafﬁc. At an ISP, it would provide directionality information
that would identify network trafﬁc originating and terminating at
the ISP clients. Retaining neighbor identiﬁcation information is an
additional requirement of the system and is especially important in
the presence of completely anonymized trafﬁc. It provides impor-
tant clues for trafﬁc characterization projects.
Meta-data: In order to preserve information about the network
trafﬁc during analysis, we need to associate meta–data with eachnetwork trafﬁc measurement. The meta–data can provide basic in-
formation regarding the measurement, such as record time, location
of measurement, anonymization level, neighbor identity, duration,
and packet loss information. In the long run, we anticipate annotat-
ing the traces with user–generated meta–data, perhaps describing
strange network occurrences, security events, or other trafﬁc fea-
tures of note.
3.2 Engineering Challenges
ConductinganInternetmeasurementstudyisadifﬁculttasksince
a few minutes of network trafﬁc can contain more than a million
datapoints. This is even more challenging when designing an on-
line, continuous monitoring system. The challenges of such a sys-
tem are primarily high volume I/O, online computation, bulk stor-
age, reliability and fault tolerance. In this section, we identify and
elaborate on these engineering requirements and challenges.
HighVolumeI/O: Amajorproblemwhenmonitoringlinksathigh
bandwidths is disk I/O. Links of 1Gbits/s capacity are fairly com-
mon today between large ISPs, with 10Gbits/s links rapidly gaining
ground. Under normal operational conditions, links are utilized at
no more than 60% on average. In our network we have observed up
to 600Mbits/s or 200Kpkts/s bidirectional trafﬁc on each link. For
both performance and privacy concerns we capture only the ﬁrst
64 bytes of data of each packet. Though on average the captured
data stream is about 100Mbits/s, during a large DDoS attack with
small packets it is possible that our system will be called to capture
at the entire link capacity! Moreover, this estimate is for just one
monitoring point. Most networks have multiple connections; in our
network, for example, we have four such links we need to monitor.
The resulting high disk I/O due to the potentially large volume of
network trafﬁc puts a signiﬁcant strain on the design of the moni-
toring infrastructure. These network I/O rates are similar to current
disk speciﬁcations, thus any protocol overhead must be avoided.
Online Computation: In addition to the disk I/O requirement,
in order to support the multi-user environment, we need to support
custom anonymization and user analysis of network trafﬁc at line
rate. This is challenging because different user anaylsis scripts may
have different run times, both because the underlying algorithms
may differ, and because users’ interests may be piqued by different
kinds of data. We must therefore accommodate large and variable
demands for computation.
Bulk Storage: At normal operational rates capturing 64B of par-
tial packets on each 1Gbits/s link can generate up to 46GB of data
every hour. In order to support this high volume of data, we need
a large and fast bulk storage system to store the data at line rates
from multiple links and support the data analysis requirements of
multiple users. Additionally, we need to ensure the storage space
is administered effectively to optimize system performance even
during mundane tasks such as directory listing and searching and
keeping track of per–user disk usage.
Reliability and Fault Tolerance: The system needs to be reliable,
robust against failures, and allow remote administration to reduce
the need for physical human intervention. Further, to ensure data
reliability, network trafﬁc that is identiﬁed as useful to a project
must be backed-up regularly.
4. ARCHITECTURE
Our goal is to continuously collect, analyze, and archive network
data for data mining applications. Three components are used to
meet this goal: A set of collection hosts (Section 4.1) that capture
network packet traces, which are transfered to a data repository
(Section 4.2), and a processing cluster (Section 4.3) that supports
pre-processing and per-user processing of the traces.
Figure 1 brieﬂy outlines the interaction of the collection, stor-
age, and analysis phases of the monitoring system. In this sec-
tion we describe the physical conﬁguration of the various architec-
tural components of our monitoring system and how they assist in
meeting the requirements and resolving these challenges. We con-
clude with the anonymization challenges created by different user
requirements.
4.1 Data Collection
The trace collection hosts are responsible for collecting packet
traces from the network. In this section we discuss the physical
conﬁguration of our system and how it helps meet our high traf-
ﬁc volume requirements. Although some of these techniques have
been used by previous trace collection systems [5], we discuss the
uniqueaspectsofthesystemandproposestrategiestohandleRAID
fail-over conditions.
To minimize packet loss at high trafﬁc volumes, we require ded-
icated, high-performance collection hosts. Our monitoring system
employs Red Hat Enterprise Linux machines with dual 2.0GHz
Xeon processors, 4GB RAM, 240GB local disk and specialized
DAG 4.3GE cards to capture network trafﬁc. Optical splitters are
deployed on each monitored link to mirror the trafﬁc to the DAG
card. The DAG cards generate a GPS synchronized timestamp for
each packet when the beginning of the packet is detected on the
link.
The most pressing engineering challenge in this system is the
requirement to handle large volumes of data I/O and processing
continuously. To reduce the volume, we conﬁgure the DAG cards
to extract the ﬁrst 64 bytes of each packet and record it into mem-
ory. Additionally, we segment traces into pieces for processing.
Two approaches to segmenting are ﬁxed-time or ﬁxed-space, where
we break traces into some time period (say, 5 minutes) or some
size (say, 512MB). We adopt the ﬁxed-space approach, segment-
ing data into 512MB ﬁles. Since trafﬁc rates vary throughout the
day, this approach provides predictable per-segment I/O and pro-
cessing requirements. Our data processing approach (described in
Section 4.3) easily accommodates the varying segment generation
rate.
Each DAG card DMA writes captured packet headers into a cir-
cular buffer located in shared memory. In order to avoid packet
loss the captured trace needs to be moved out of the buffer before it
ﬁlls. Our DAG talker process is responsible for this task. It moves
the data out of the buffer and saves it to disk. If the 512MB ﬁle
size limit is reached, the current trace ﬁle is closed and a new one
is started. Although, it is possible to transfer the packet headers
directly from the card to the data storage, bypassing main memory,
our approach helps buffer trafﬁc bursts and reduces packet losses
during data transfer.
The data storage location is a fast RAID server accessible via
NFS. The RAID may become unavailable to the collection system
due to network failures, NFS server failure, or disk failures. In
order to support continuous collection, we provide fail-over to a
local disk when the RAID server is unavailable. We developed a
DAG mover program that periodically monitors the availability of
the RAID server and triggers data storage on the local disk if the
RAID is unreachable.
4.2 Data Repository
The data repository is a DataDirect high-performance RAID net-
worked storage system rated at 1.5Gbytes/s I/O throughput. Cur-Figure 1: Interaction between various components of the monitoring system
rently, our system accesses storage through NFS over an Ethernet
gigabit link. The NFS server adds considerable overhead to our
system. After performing extensive client and server side tuning
by varying blocksize, timeout, and mounting parameters we were
able to improve the throughput from 6Mbits/s to 300Mbits/s. In
the near future we will connect the data repository directly to the
collection and analysis system using ﬁber channel. Once the whole
system is connected using ﬁber channel we anticipate throughput
in excess of 1Gbits/s.
Our system has 11TB of shared disk space. Since each mon-
itoring location generates over 1 TB of data every day, we need
mechanisms that ensure proper use of disk space. We have imple-
mented a garbage collection system that expunges old trace ﬁles
that have been identiﬁed as unimportant by all users. The garbage
collector cleans up ﬁles periodically several times a day or when
disk space utilization exceeds 70%. We also have a quota checker
system that regularly audits usage of the shared disk space among
the users. Finally, traces that have been identiﬁed as important by
the users are backed up periodically onto tape.
In order to preserve information of the network trafﬁc we need to
associate meta-data with each network trafﬁc measurement. There
are several options in associating meta-data with a trace. One tech-
nique would be to store meta-data in a separate ﬁle, which is often
convenient since it facilitates subsequent processing. However, it
requires additional separate storage and is prone to loss or disasso-
ciation with the primary trace ﬁle. Another technique is to encode
meta-data information within the trace ﬁlename and in the same
ﬁle. While this technique is more space efﬁcient, it binds the meta-
data to the trace and as a result the meta-data is lost when a trace
is deleted, making it impossible to revisit the meta-data at a later
time.
Various types of meta-data can be recorded with a traces. Some
may provide basic information regarding the measurement, such as
record time, location of measurement, or duration, while others can
be more detailed and could be obtained after post-processing, such
as packet loss, number of ﬂows, and protocol mix. Currently, we
store meta-data only for ﬁles identiﬁed as important and encode it
within the ﬁle to reduce storage space. In the future, we plan to
explore archiving meta-data for all network trafﬁc in separate logs.
4.3 Processing Cluster
All data analysis is performed at the USC Center for High Per-
formance Computing and Communications (HPCC) [12]. We have
reserved a 16-node partition for exclusive use for our system in
order to guarantee service. All analysis processes share HPCC’s
common Portable Batch System (PBS) queue [6] and our cluster
consists of Linux nodes with dual 3GHz Xeon processors and 1GB
of memory.
The monitoring system needs to process a large amount of data
online and is limited by disk I/O. As discussed in Section 3.2, we
maintain ﬁxed-space 512MB trace ﬁles in order to better manage
the I/O bandwidth and processing requirements.
There are two categories of analysis performed on the network
trafﬁc:
• Each trace is pre-processed to address privacy and security
concerns. Pre-processing of the traces consists of scrubbing
and scrambling of the packet headers. Additional details on
anonymization techniques are discussed in Section 5.
• A trace can then be analyzed by multiple users by a per-user
process. The user process is deﬁned independently by each
user for each trace.
All the processing on the cluster is done with dispatcher-worker
applications in order to keep up with the online computational re-
quirements of our system, similar to other systems [4]. The dis-
patcher application periodically monitors the workload and active
processingcapabilitybyqueuingworkerprocessesthroughtheHPCC
batchprocessingsystem. Whenworkisavailableitstartsadditional
processingjobs, uptoaconﬁgurablemaximumlevelofparallelism.
Workers run independently, processing available trace ﬁles and
terminating when all ﬁles are processed or a time limit is reached.Traces are kept in different directories corresponding to their pro-
cessing status (scrubbed, scrambled, user analyzed).
The pre-processing and per-user processing systems can have
multiple worker processes analyzing the ﬁles at any time, limited
only by the number of processors available in the cluster. Once
a trace is pre-processed, the system creates hard-links in the user
space based on the user’s data security clearance (explained in Sec-
tion 5. We found that the loose coupling between pre-process and
per-user process phases using dispatcher-worker applications helps
deal with the high volume trafﬁc efﬁciently and isolates failures,
thus enhancing the reliability and fault tolerance of the analysis
system. We also have an extensive monitoring system that gathers
statistics for deployed worker processes and un-processed ﬁles and
alerts the operator in case of potential problems.
Our system must be robust to processing errors for several rea-
sons. First, if a trace is not completely scrubbed or scrambled, it
would leak sensitive privacy information. Second, because we al-
low user jobs to post-process traces we cannot assume those jobs
are error-free. We therefore consider all processing suspect and
examine a number of possible failure scenarios: (1) the job is not
run, (2) the job runs and stops in the middle with part of the trace
processed, (3) the job runs multiple times sequentially, (4) the job
runs multiple times concurrently. To handle a wide range of errors,
we have designed our jobs to be idempotent, that is, they can run
multiple times without any ill-effect. Therefore if the job monitor-
ing system detects conditions (1) and (2) it restarts the job on the
trace. In case of repeated failure in processing the trace, the trace is
marked and administrator is alerted of the error. Failure condition
(3) is less critical as it results in wasted computational power but
the trace is processed correctly. In this case we alert the adminis-
trator in case of processing the same trace more than twice. Failure
condition (4) is the most critical as the trace may be overwritten and
not processed correctly. We have taken all measures to ensure that
this condition does not occur in our system by moving ﬁles to an
working directory by the worker process. If such as error does oc-
cur, the job monitoring system is designed to alert the administrator
at once.
5. CUSTOM ANONYMIZATION
Privacy and security issues are compounded in a multi-user envi-
ronment. Sharing of raw Internet packet traces must be restricted,
since traces contain sensitive user data and control information.
Clearly user data must treated carefully since it may contain e-mail,
or passwords, credit card, or other private information. Control in-
formationis aconcern since when combined with external informa-
tion such as DHCP logs and ISP subscriber databases, IP addresses
can be mapped back to individuals’ identities. A range of privacy
laws govern network trace data, ranging from wiretap laws to stu-
dent conﬁdentiality requirements. As a result, ISPs must be very
careful with how trace data is managed, both from an ethical and a
legal standpoint.
Unfortunately, current trace anonymization techniques that elim-
inate all private information severely limit research. Due to the pri-
vacy issues with raw traces we propose a multi-level data security
clearance scheme that allows the user to access real-world traces
based on research needs. We store real-world network traces at
different levels of anonymization and control access to the traces
based on the users’ data security clearance. Each trace is sub-
jected to a scrub phase, that removes the packet payload infor-
mation to ensure that user data is not directly leaked. A trace is
then passed through a scramble phase, that remaps IP addresses to
preﬁx-preserving random values [8]. Additionally, we record the
host IP to anonymized address mappings in order to support cus-
tom anonymization, where a user may want to know the reverse
mapping for a few hosts that are under the control of the user, and
therefore do not have any privacy concerns.
Each data security clearance level is associated with a set of data
movement rules, that specify how the traces should be handled. The
higher the clearance the more restrictive the the data movement
rules. For example, users with access to un-anonymized traces have
to perform all analysis on our systems and cannot move the traces
away. We discussed this in more detail in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
In order to support long term studies, we maintain consistent IP
address renumbering using hashing [3]. We refer to this as per-
sistence of the scrambled trafﬁc. Additionally, it is also impor-
tant to maintain neighbor identiﬁcation or directionality informa-
tionwithinthetraces. Thisisdoneduringthescramblephasewhere
the MAC addresses in the packet are renumbered with a persistence
of one month.
6. EVALUATION
We deployed our collection system at two locations at a large
regional ISP. In this section, we ﬁrst describe our monitoring loca-
tion and the type of trafﬁc mix we observe. We then evaluate our
analysis system in a multi-user environment.
6.1 Monitored Network Description
We collect network trafﬁc through a coordinated effort between
multiple sites within Los Nettos, a large regional ISP in the Los
Angeles area. Los Nettos connects with several large ISPs includ-
ing Verio, Cogent, Level 3, and Internet II. Los Nettos provides an
interesting view of the Internet since it is close enough to the edge
to observe regional and end system effects, but also large enough to
capture a diverse trafﬁc mix. Los Nettos provides access to several
different classes of network trafﬁc. It has a diverse group of aca-
demic and commercial clientele, including USC, TRW, JPL, and
Aerospace Corporation.
Los Nettos has an aggregate bidirectional trafﬁc volume of over
1Gbits/s. We have strategically placed two tracing hosts that allow
our system to capture up to 85% of the network trafﬁc. One collec-
tion host monitors a link with 600Mbits/s aggregate bidirectional
trafﬁc while the other host monitors a link with 250Mbits/s. Af-
ter partial packet capture the links generate nearly 160Mbits/s of
packet header traces.
6.2 Regular Operation
Our system handles multiple users with different data and sani-
tization requirements. During peak times a trace ﬁle is generated
every 30 seconds and the analysis cluster pre-processes and runs
per-user processing on these ﬁles continuously.
Figure2(a)showsjobdurationforaﬁve-hourperiod. Ascrubber-
dispatcher schedules jobs every ﬁfteen minutes to pre-process new
trace ﬁles, and two user-dispatchers spawn jobs to run user-deﬁned
processes. User1 handles un-anonymized data and uses anomaly
detection techniques to detect denial of service attacks. User2 char-
acterizes P2P trafﬁc and extracts all TCP packets with the SYN or
FIN ﬂags set. The scrubbing process keeps up with traces using
one worker job but approximately every 45 minutes two jobs are
spawned to clear the backlog. User1’s worker jobs typically pro-
cess all ﬁles within two minutes and User2’s worker jobs run be-
tween 5–10 minutes. Thus all processing, scrubbing and two per-
user workers, are handled efﬁciently in real-time by the analysis
system.
This demonstrates our ability to handle different user require-
ments. Since jobs are loosely scheduled by the cluster system we
can handle varying computational requirements of different users 0
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Figure 2: File processing on the cluster under normal and failure operational conditions.
without carefully monitoring and tuning our system to adjust to
changes in load or post-processing. In addition, the parallel pro-
cessing capability of the cluster allows the trace processing to run
slower than real-time without building large backlogs.
6.3 Failure Recovery
An important aspect of our loosely coupled architecture is that
it is robust in the face of various failures. Figure 2(b) shows the
progress of pre-processing data ﬁles before, during and after an in-
frastructure failure. At approximately 18:00 (labeled as time period
A) the queuing system stopped accepting jobs and the number of
ﬁles in need of processing grew. During time period B there was
a complete cluster failure; all processing jobs still running were
terminated. The job monitoring system discussed in Section 4.3
handled cleaning up after these prematurely terminated jobs. Just
before 22:00, the cluster came back on line. Note that our pro-
cessing system responded to the backlog of work by triggering the
maximum level of parallelism (8 concurrent jobs) until the backlog
was cleared in period C. We also observe that some intermittent
failures and restarts during this time.
This example illustrates the robustness of our system to failures.
Because work and computation are loosely scheduled, loss of com-
pute nodes simply delays processing rather than losing data. We
believe our system can tolerate temporary loss of any part of the
system other than the data collection hosts themselves.
7. SUMMARY
In this paper we described a passive, continuous monitoring sys-
tem to collect, archive, and analyze network data captured a Los
Nettos, a large regional ISP within Los Angeles. We outlined the
major requirements and challenges for the monitoring system. Our
system supports multiple users, where each user can have different
data and anonymization requirements. Further, the system is capa-
ble of handling large I/O and processing requirements due to the
high-volumes of network data. We described a viable architecture
and evaluated it with two-users to show that it effectively handles
variable load. Traces collected via this system are available through
the PREDICT project (http://www.predict.org).
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